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The article is based on the criticism of philosophy for children (PFC) 
being considered as part of the culture of therapy. This criticism claims 
that PFC treats children as “fragile and vulnerable” and that the PFC 
programme, which primarily aims at enhancing social and emotional 
skills, in fact contributes to the dependency and frailty of children. The 
article comes to the defence of PFC by presenting arguments against 
this reproach and goes on to analyse the concept that is in the heart 
of this criticism, i.e. the relationship between philosophy and therapy. 
In this context, a reference is made to Wittgenstein’s concept of phi-
losophy as therapy which proves to be instrumental in reflecting on 
the relationship between academic philosophy and philosophical prac-
tices as well as in considering the fundamental goals of philosophy for 
children.
Key  words: philosophy for children, culture of therapy, philosophy as 
therapy, Ludwig Wittgenstein
I
The “Perspectives of Philosophy” in the title of the symposium are 
in plural, which implies that there are several perspectives. One pos-
sible approach to the issue proposed in the title would be to compare 
several philosophical perspectives; another would be to describe a per-
spective that is particularly relevant. In my contribution, I shall attempt 
to do both.
Philosophical practices are new approach to philosophy, whereas 
the old, well-established, prevalent approach could be referred to as ac-
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ademic philosophy.1 The attitude of academic philosophy towards new 
philosophical practices has evolved gradually. Teaching philosophy in 
secondary  schools  can  be  considered  a  predecessor  of  contemporary 
philosophical practices. In the eyes of academic philosophy, teaching 
philosophy in school was a welcome addition as it expanded its hori-
zon. Nevertheless, teaching philosophy was viewed as something ex-
trinsic to philosophy: true philosophy consists in philosopher’s thinking 
and writing, perhaps lecturing, all else is merely the popularisation of 
philosophy.
As  philosophical  practices  advanced,  gained  autonomy,  and 
started claiming their own inherent philosophicity,  the  attitude  of 
academic philosophy towards philosophical practices went through 
several stages. The first stage was ignorance: this development was 
neither noticed nor mentioned. Then the criticism came: this was 
not  actual  philosophy,  as  children  doing  philosophy for children 
(PFC), for instance, do not actually philosophise, since they are 
not  capable  of  reflective  thinking,  so  this  cannot  be  real  philoso-
phy. Finally, academic philosophy accepted the new field, but this 
acceptance mostly consisted in tolerating these new philosophical 
practices, only rarely were they considered as a chance to revitalise 
philosophy.
On the other hand, the discourse within new philosophical prac-
tices has also been evolving. The advocacy for the possibility of practi-
cal philosophy came first, followed by presentation of its methods and 
descriptions of practices and experience. Later on, an analysis, assess-
ment and criticism of certain working methods also followed. Clearly, 
philosophical practices have attained autonomy (which is corroborated 
by the establishment of organisations, journals, and expert networks) 
and philosophical legitimacy. Even this conference is a case in point. 
There is no longer a struggle for recognition, no sense of threat, so the 
question that arises is what shapes the relationship between the two 
areas. In my contribution, I shall argue in favor of the hypothesis that a 
dialogue between the two perspectives can provide a better understand-
ing of both of them. I shall illustrate this using the example of therapy 
and philosophy for children.
1 Further elaboration of this distinction and the argument for the “non-university philo-
sophy” could be found in the study Philosophy, A School of Freedom (UNESCO, 2007).




mostly been implicit, a discussion that starts with school and therapy, 
and continues with the inclusion of philosophy. The story begins with 
the criticism of contemporary culture. Frank Furedi (Furedi, 2004), a 
sociologist who is engaged enough to merit a place in the tradition of 
critical  theory of  society, pointed  to  a  strong presence of  therapeutic 
discourse  in  contemporary  society  and  to  the  negative  consequences 
of this therapeutic turn for the autonomy of the subject. In their book 
The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education theorists of education 
Ecclestone and Haynes use this thesis when analysing changes in the 
field of education.
The authors focus on the general inclination of contemporary cul-
ture which is based on a specific understanding of mankind. The con-
temporary man  is  considered  to  be  sensitive,  vulnerable,  fragile  and 
therefore in need of protection and help. We are all weak, burdened, we 
all suffer from poor self-esteem. The individual’s need for assistance 
is reflected in the classroom: it has given rise to new working methods 
such as opening up  to one another,  conversation,  teaching emotional 
literacy, cooperation. Most importantly, in schools these skills are be-
ginning to take precedence over content, knowledge, understanding and 
the truth. Compared to the traditional structure of education, this proc-
ess entails a twofold reduction: a reduction of the purpose of school and 
a reduction of the individual. The primary aim of schools is no longer to 
transmit knowledge and foster intellectual autonomy and emancipation, 
but to provide assistance to the helpless individual. The authors believe 
that this is a self-fulfilling prophecy: because the children are being 
treated as “frail, vulnerable and in need of support”, that is precisely 
what they become.
The authors also refer to philosophy for children in this context. 
Two distinct references are made here. The first admits that certain ac-
tivities  contained  in  the description of  the PFC programme  focus on 
discussing philosophical issues, whereas
“… other interventions presented as PFC are imbued with social and emotio-
nal purposes and outcomes, including feeling good about yourself and others, 
being respectful, empathetic and disagreeing in ‘appropriate’ ways, how to 
deal with ‘hurt’ feelings…” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, 33)
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The second reference suggests that the social and emotional pur-
poses mentioned  above  are  in  fact  symptomatic  of manipulations of 
education and social engineering:
“Subjects such as ‘philosophy for children’ use therapeutic rituals to train 
children in empathy, respect, ‘appropriate’ ways of listening, tolerating diver-
se views and responding in particular ways in order to be emotionally literate, 
tolerant citizens…” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, 151)
Joanna Haynes (Haynes, 2014) speaks in defence of PFC. She con-
curs  that  PFC  does  entail  some  difficulties  that  she  believes  are  the 
result of insufficient philosophical education of the teachers. However, 
she points out that the social and emotional purposes are a legitimate 
constituent of PFC:
“Human flourishing and consolation in the face of suffering have been among 
the concerns  of  philosophers  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  these  should  be 
among the questions pursued by children. As much as they enjoy the adventu-
rous space provided by PFC, children also welcome the opportunity to listen 
and to be heard and they describe the sense of feeling cared for and not being 
alone, when others listen to them.” (Haynes, 2014, 7)
She also adds that in its core PFC is not only a part of the thera-
peutic culture, but in fact a place where it is possible to withstand this 
culture:
“PFC is one of the few educational perspectives that does not trivialise and 
infantilise children. It engages the voice of self-expression and the voice of 
social action. It promotes both passionate and dispassionate dialogue: talking 
about things that matter with children in ways that go beyond a repetition of 
the given.” (Haynes, 2014, 6)
The content of her response shows that she is coming to the defence 
of PFC. It was a timely intervention mostly targeting teachers, parents 
and general public, and an immediate attempt to refute the unfounded 
criticism of PFC. Consequently, Haynes does not analyse the concept of 
therapy. More specifically, it remains unclear whether PFC can in any 
way be connected to therapy and if so, whether this connection can be 
founded in philosophy. Can philosophy be considered as therapy?
III
The answer is multi-faceted. Philosophy today is not considered as 
therapy. University professors lecturing in philosophy may see them-
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selves  as  historians,  custodians,  sounding  boards  for  philosophy,  but 
definitely not as therapists. Nevertheless, a strong correlation between 
philosophy and therapy can be observed in the centre of the philosophi-
cal tradition at the time of its early beginnings in ancient Greece as well 
as at the beginning of the 20th century. Jeremy Wisnewski (Wisnewski, 
2003) has detected “five forms of philosophical therapy” in the his-
tory of philosophy. Pierre Hadot and his thesis that ancient philosophy 
was inextricably linked to spiritual exercise and personal transforma-
tion was not even mentioned there, however the list does include the 
icon of 20th century philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein. If philosophy for 
children is founded on philosophical tradition, there is no reason why it 
should refuse any connection to therapy.
According to Hadot, in ancient philosophy “philosophical dis-
course,  then, originated in a choice of life and an existential option”, 
so “consequently, philosophy is above all a way of life, but one which 
is intimately linked to philosophical discourse” (Hadot, 2002, 4). “The 
original and authentic conception of Greco-Roman philosophy” and its 
“existential dimension” have been never completely forgotten, however 
philosophy was dominated by the “scholastic teaching of philosophy 
which has always had a tendency to emphasize the theoretical, abstract, 
and conceptual side of philosophy” (Hadot, 2002, 237). “The practice 
of philosophy” is considered to be “an effort to become aware of our-
selves, our being-in-the-world, and our being-with-others (…), an effort 
to ‘relearn how to see the world’”. The models of Greek philosophy can 
be relevant in modern time, since they “correspond to permanent, fun-
damental attitudes which all human beings find necessary when they set 
about seeking wisdom” (Hadot, 2002, 278). This model of philosophy 
also entails philosophical reflection, since “living as a philosopher also 
means to reflect, to reason, to conceptualize in a rigorous, technical way 
– or, as Kant used to say, ‘to think for oneself’” (Hadot, 2002, 280).
The link between philosophy and therapy construed in this way is 
compatible with philosophy in school. The aim is not a weak, depend-
ent individual, but the correlation of reflection critical thinking–being–
judging–acting.
Furthermore,  philosophy  for  children may  be  able  to  find  some 
answers within its own tradition, with its own founder. When Lipman 
(Lipman, 2008) speaks of the impulse that had brought him from aca-
demic philosophy to the risky undertaking of the PFC project, he often 
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refers to student riots and the response of universities to these riots. In 
his  interpretation,  the strongest  incentive for starting the PFC project 
came from the lack of thinking. His university students were not think-
ing, neither were the universities. The first can be related to the fact that 
the students did not have the appropriate habits and skills. But the lack 
of reflection on the side of institutions is related to the societal effect of 
that individual lack of competence. In this context, PFC can be seen as 
having twofold therapeutic role. It can be therapeutic for the individual 
by liberating them of their inability of independent thinking and, con-
sequently, it can be therapeutic for society by liberating it of reckless 
convictions that lead to confusion. Philosophy for children is a school 
of critical thinking and a school of critical questioning of one’s own 
beliefs, actions, and values.
Lipman clearly sees great therapeutic potential in critical thinking 
and he is not alone. Elliot C. Cohen views philosophy as a method of 
correcting flawed thinking. He believes that flawed thinking leads to 
flawed action and he is therefore convinced that critical thinking can 
bring on changes in the life of the individual.
“Free thinking aims at helping to expose the irrational, self-defeating, and 
destructive ideas that foreclose the human potential for productivity and hap-
piness. It aims at overcoming these irrational ideas and replacing them with 
rational ones. It provides the logical tools and skill-building exercises that can 
help you see through the sophistry and twisted logic that underlies a closed 
society – one that fails to apply rational methods to come to grips with human 
problems.” (Cohen, 2009, 1)
In her book with the title Thinking Your Way to Freedom, Susan 
Gardner argues that critical thinking is not merely a thinking skill;  it 
also entails an existential and ethical dimension. Conscious control over 
practical judgments means a conscious control over one’s values which 
in turn results in control over one’s actions. Critical thinking leads to 
autonomy and autonomy leads to freedom. As she puts it: “Thinking 
through value issues impartially can thus be considered (…) the prin-
ciple of freedom” (Gardner, 2009, 41). Rational thinking thus leads to 
human excellence and teaching critical thinking leads to personal trans-
formation that enables individuals who engage in practical reasoning 
to “free themselves from determining powers of social influence and, 
in so doing, make autonomy and its existential counterpart, individual-
ity, possible” (Gardner, 2009, 41). The aim of critical thinking is not to 
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affect the level of thinking, but the level of existence – the aim is a free 
person, an individuality.
All the above expositions clearly show that critical thinking in it-
self has a therapeutic value. However, practical experience shows that 
this conclusion is far too optimistic: mere teaching of critical thinking 
is not sufficient when it comes to achieving more ambitious goals. Even 
Lipman himself was forced to confess that pupils are quickly bored by 
the teaching of critical thinking. The reason why the scope of critical 
thinking is so limited is in the very narrow concept of human being 
that  is usually assumed in  the field of education, namely the concept 
of human being as an individual who has certain beliefs and values. In 
fact, the true nature of the relationship between the individual and his 
or her beliefs and values is not the one of “having”, but rather the one 
of “being”. In a sense, beliefs and values are abstract notions that do 
not exist in the individual’s reality. They only exist in theories and if 
they come into existence for the individual, this can only be as a result 
of reflection.
How can the possible therapeutic effects of PFC then be consid-
ered? At this point, the answer to this question must be deferred in order 
to point out a different aspect, namely the role of this question. My the-
sis is that this question can in fact act as an answer, namely as an answer 
to the question what is the appropriate perspective of the relationship 
between academic and practical philosophy.
To put things in very schematic terms: the dialogue between prac-
tical and academic philosophy should tackle the subjects that put both 
perspectives in a quandary and should primarily focus on points where 
both perspectives are faced with their own impotence. Philosophy for 
children prides itself on its practical effects, but it is at a loss when 
trying to approach these effects in a systematic way. Academic philoso-
phy, on the other hand, has no difficulty with self-reflection as such, but 
it is ill at ease reflecting on its relevance in the contemporary world.
At the same time, it can be said that most of the concepts that new 
philosophical practices need for their self-reflection have been already 
developed in academic philosophy. That is why the quandaries and di-
lemmas of philosophical practices can help academic philosophy to rec-
ognise its inherent practical aspect. The dialogue between the academic 
perspective and the perspective of philosophical practices is therefore 
easy to establish when both are faced with their own shortcomings. 
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In  the course of  this dialogue,  they can help one another  to discover 
inherent elements that have gone unnoticed – one can help the other to 
establish a new perspective in relation to itself.
IV
In terms of PFC, the link between philosophy and therapy is there-
fore significant for a number of reasons. Primarily because it enables 
more articulated dialogue between “new practices of philosophy” 
(UNESCO, 2007) and academic philosophy. Whereas academic phi-
losophy as  the domain of most professional philosophers  in  the con-
temporary world often ignores philosophical practices and considers 
them as alien to philosophy as such, philosophy as therapy is a domain 
where the authorities of philosophy, i.e. the authors of the classics of 
traditional academic philosophy, can often be found reflecting on phi-
losophy in more practical terms – as philosophical practice.
It therefore makes sense to review the relationship between PFC 
and a philosopher who is an authority in contemporary academic philo-
sophy and whose works also explicitly refer to therapy. Ludwig Wittgen-
stein is a case in point: not only that he is a renowned author whose 
works are subjects of detailed studies and numerous comments, but he 
is also the founder of a philosophical approach that remains very topi-
cal within academic philosophy. In this context it is irrelevant that the 
very understanding of Wittgenstein as an academic philosopher might 
be incorrect and in opposition to the very spirit of his philosophy, which 
is antiphilosophy according to Alain Badiou (Badiou, 2011).
For the vitality of philosophical practices such as PFC it is crucial 
that they do not settle down with being merely practices of philoso-
phy, they should instead stay in contact with contemporary (abstract, 
theoretical) philosophical reflection. This link can be strengthened by 




siders its own. By advocating his concept of antiphilosophy, Badiou 
highlights the well-known but somewhat suppressed truth that some of 
the philosophers who constitute the canon of contemporary academic 
philosophy were extremely critical of the established philosophy and of 
philosophical methods used at universities.
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The analysis of the relationship between PFC and academic phi-
losophy might pave the way for a reflection on the internal structure 
of both domains and may well undermine certain convictions. Instead 
of considering practical philosophy as an impoverished form of philo-
sophical reflection, this analysis might reveal what a limited view aca-
demic philosophy has of its own tradition. On the other hand, this is 
also an opportunity for PFC to engage in self-reflection: by studying 
the differences and similarities between itself and a philosophical prac-
tice that is fundamentally different. By striving to answer the question 
“What is philosophy?”, it may well discover new aspects of its own 
presuppositions, possibilities and weaknesses.
V
Researchers who have been searching for the philosophical sources 
of Lipman’s concept of philosophy for children were mostly focused on 
American pragmatists, i.e. John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, George 
Herbert Mead, and Justus Buchler (Daniel, 1997, 14). In parallel to this 
search for the intellectual sources of PFC, a quest is underway for new 
philosophical connections and convergence in relation to contemporary 
philosophical reflection. Most authors presenting PFC to the general 
public point out that PFC is not related to any specific tradition and it 
is therefore open to liaisons with various traditions, which means that it 
can easily be adapted to any cultural or intellectual environment. How-
ever, there is an exception.
Joanna Haynes opens her chapter on the roots of philosophical in-
quiry by stating that:
“The roots of this practice originate in a number of different philosophical 
traditions. Practitioners may emphasise different aspects of it according to 
their own beliefs, influences and circumstances.” (Haynes, 2008, 55)
However, she goes on saying that: “It is associated strongly with 
Plato’s teacher, the Greek philosopher Socrates” (Haynes, 2008, 55). 
Robert Fischer takes a similar view by linking PFC to dialogic thinking, 
which is in itself related to the tradition established by Socrates (Fisher, 
2008, 138). It seems that in many ways the model for PFC is the image 
of Socrates asking questions, wondering, guiding his interlocutors.
The  assumptions  that  philosophy  consists  of  questioning  that  is 
aimed at re-examining one’s own life and that an “unexamined life is 
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not worth living” represent the cornerstones of PFC and its endeavor 
for critical thinking and intellectual autonomy. In this context, Socratic 
questioning is crucial for children who are taking part in the community 
of inquiry as well as for the adult acting as facilitator who stimulates 
their reflection process by asking Socratic questions. At first, children 
perceive questions as a framework in which the inquiry takes place and 
then go on to internalise the process by integrating this framework into 
their own intellectual world. Lipman as the founder of PFC also con-
siders Socrates a key figure:
“The paradigm of doing philosophy is the towering, solitary figure of Socra-
tes, for whom philosophy was neither an acquisition nor profession but a way 
of life. What Socrates models for us is not philosophy known or philosophy 
applied but philosophy practised. He challenges us to acknowledge that phi-
losophy as deed, as form of life, is something that any of us can emulate.” 
(Lipman, 1988, 12)
This is in no way an insignificant reference, since Socrates is one 
of the founders of philosophy. Western philosophy may indeed be a 
series of comments to Plato, however Plato considered himself to be a 
student of Socrates. If Plato is the father of Western philosophy, Socra-
tes is not merely the father of the father, but a person the father strives to 
understand. Nevertheless, Socrates as a role-model does have a weak-
ness. He lived in a different world and was engaged in reflections in a 
different era. The reference to Socrates therefore always begs the ques-
tion on how would Socrates act in modern times. And if there ever was 
a clear parallel to Socrates in contemporary philosophy, it is definitely 
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The two authors have a lot in common. They both claim that they 
do not offer any truths or advocate any theory. They both emphasise 
reflection and question generally accepted and self-evident truths. 
They both have a specific approach to writing: Socrates never wrote 
anything, whereas Wittgenstein constantly redrafted his notes and pub-
lished a single text only that he spent the rest of his life criticising. Both 
were equally passionate about philosophy and it was this passion that 
determined their entire lives (Genova, 1995, 7).
According to David G. Stern, Wittgenstein’s position that philoso-
phy does not advance any thesis puts him in contradiction with most 
modern philosophy, yet this very position also classifies him under the 
philosophical tradition that has its origin in the Platonic theory of recol-
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lection. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the two 
approaches: according to Plato, learning is based on the recollection of 
knowledge which was in one’s possession in a previous life, while Witt-
genstein emphasises the awareness of what one already knows without 
being able to put this tacit knowledge into words (Stern, 1995, 17). 
Norman Malcolm also mentions a conversation in which Wittgenstein 
himself pointed out the similarity between his approach to philosophy 
and the “Socratic doctrine that knowledge is reminiscence” (Malcolm, 
1984, 44).
On the other hand, one of the key features of Wittgenstein’s later 
work is his critique of essentialism. Essentialism, for which Gareth 
Hallett (Hallett, 1991) claims to be a specific characteristic of Western 
thought, can easily be illustrated using Plato’s theory of ideas, accord-
ing to which there is a particular class of entities – the universals – that 
cannot be perceived by senses. When Socrates asks about the definition 
of something, he is in a search of the essence of the thing to be defined. 
Throughout the tradition of Western philosophy, this essence has been 
referred to under a number of different names, such as universal, es-
sence, general idea. This very position – that words are related to an 
abstract essence of things – represents the main object of criticism in 
Wittgenstein’s later work. It is therefore hardly a surprise when Ray 
Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein quotes Wittgenstein’s statement: 
“that his method could be summed up by saying that it was the exact 
opposite of that of Socrates” (Monk, 1990, 339).
With  Socrates  and Wittgenstein  being  so  close  in  certain  terms 
and poles apart in others and taking into consideration how committed 
PFC is to Socrates, it is no wonder that references to Wittgenstein are 
rare. Karin Murris is one of the authors who resort to Wittgenstein 
when defending PFC. If the main reproach to children is that they are 
incapable of engaging in philosophy in the way adults do, then this re-
proach is based on the assumption that children should in fact engage 
in philosophy in the same way as adults. In an attempt to gauge the 
scope of this assumption, Murris introduces Wittgenstein and his criti-
cism of traditional philosophy. “Real philosophy”, that is supposed to 
be beyond  the capacity of children,  is  focused on general principles 
that are used to explain particular cases. According to Wittgenstein, 
as I shall elaborate next, this is precisely how philosophy creates false 
problems.
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“Wittgenstein says that philosophical problems, metaphorically speaking, are 
like a disease.
 
They arise when philosophers are misled by the superficial 
grammar of our language. In the case of the philosophical problem of identity 
(as in the Ship of Theseus), when a police officer asks you: ‘Please prove your 
identity’, it is possible to be misled into thinking that ‘identity’ is the name 
of a thing – emphasised by the fact that a usual response would be to prove 
our identity by showing a thing – passport, driving license, etc. – in response 
to the demand. It is the language learned from an early age that spreads this 
‘disease’ – i.e., assuming a name presupposes the existence of an object.” 
(Murris, 2014)
Murris refers to Wittgenstein in order to find support for the thesis 
that academic philosophy cannot be a reason why children should be 
denied the capability to philosophise, nor can it be a model for philoso-
phy. Not only that adult philosophy cannot be a model for children’s 
philosophy, but Wittgenstein goes even further with his claim that adult 
philosophy is wrong philosophy and that the tradition of adult philoso-
phy gives rise to a multitude of problems that philosophy must solve.
Murris uses Wittgenstein to defend PFC from the attacks of adult 
academic philosophy. She is able to do so because criticism of academic 
philosophy is a significant aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought. However, 
the question remains whether Wittgenstein can also be used to improve 
PFC’s understanding of itself or, in our case, whether Wittgenstein can 
be used to improve the understanding of the relationship between ther-
apy and PFC.
VI
What is the gist of Wittgenstein’s criticism of philosophy? Robert 
Fogelin summarises it in the following simple statement:
“Philosophers are led into confusion because they are antecedently disposed 
to view various uses of language in ways inappropriate to them. This is not 
usually (or simply) a matter of reasoning from false premises about language 
but is, instead, a tendency to view language from a skewed or disoriented per-
spective. The proper task of philosophy – indeed, its whole task – is to induce 
us to abandon such improper perspective.” (Fogelin 1996, 34)
This attitude towards traditional philosophy can be liberating for 
PFC. It seems that there is no need for PFC to deal with philosophical 
tradition because this  tradition is not only irrelevant, but  in fact even 
harmful. It is a source of faults and errors and should best be forgot-
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ten. For those who have fallen victim to this error, the final purpose of 
philosophy remains to be criticism of its own former errors. But as we 
shall see, this view is misleading.
Wittgenstein describes the reasons why philosophers have fallen 
victim to this error using a number of metaphors, the most renowned of 
these being:
“It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look 
at. It never occurs to us to take them off.” (Wittgenstein, 1997, par. 103)
The metaphor with the glasses suggests that the source of delusion 
is not the world or language, but the subject who has a skewed view 
of the world. However, the aberration does not originate from the sub-
ject himself, but from the instrument he is using to enhance his vision. 
Glasses, which are normally used to correct deficiencies of our eye-
sight, are used here as a metaphor for the aberration which is prevent-
ing subject from seeing things as they are. This image raises questions: 
Where did these glasses come from and who designed them? Do those 
glasses represent mistaken philosophical theories that prevent us from 
seeing the world correctly? If that is the case, the problem can be solved 
by renouncing philosophy. But even then it remains to be discovered 
how those mistaken theories came into being.
Yet,  for Wittgenstein  philosophy  is  not merely  a  leisure  activity 
one can simply give up, it is a force that captures a man and does not let 
him go, like an intractable disease. Therefore the aim of philosophy is 
to eliminate the desire for philosophy:
“The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing phi-
losophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no 
longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.” (Wittgenstein, 
1997, par. 133)
In order for the subject to liberate himself and eliminate the need 
for philosophy, he requires therapy:
“The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.” 




ing but prevent it and act as obstacles on the way towards understand-
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ing. Philosophy is thus construed as a therapy and as something that 
is “purely negative” (Fogelin, 1996, 35). This negativity encompasses 
two levels. On the one hand, philosophy is forced to criticise mistaken 
theories, and on the other hand, it must lead towards the elimination 
of  the urge for a certain  lack of understanding and a certain effort  to 
resolve things.
Anthony Kenny also mentions two aims of philosophy according 
to Wittgenstein, but his focus is slightly different. The first aim of phi-
losophy  is  therapeutic  and pursues  the goal  not  of  a  solution,  but  of 
dissolution of philosophical problems, while its second aim is to de-
scribe the actual functioning of language. The therapeutic mission of 
philosophy  is not  to directly  treat  the desire, but  to generate  internal 
criticism of the products of philosophy. Its task is “the destruction of 
philosophical  illusion,  the castles  in  the air built by bad philosophy” 
(Kenny, 2008, 139).
The therapeutic process is not a negation claiming that the prob-
lems are false and should therefore be abandoned. In order to eliminate 
the urge for philosophy, problems must be perceived as real problems 
and solutions as real solutions. Philosophers live in a world of illusion 
and the therapy consists in accepting their theses, entering their world 
and demonstrating the fallacy of their world from within. This is a type 
of  reductio ad absurdum, an  internal  negation  of mistaken  theories, 
which indirectly also entails a negation of the erroneous questions that 
have led to these theories.
The internal criticism of philosophy runs parallel with a different 
approach to language. Questions originating from an erroneous under-
standing of language can be dissolved by describing the habitual use of 
terms and the plurality that is characteristic of everyday language use:
“Someone who wants to say something metaphysical about thought may well 
be cured of his wish by being reminded of the many different ways in which 
‘think’ is used.” (Kenny, 2008, 144)
And next to it, by pointing out the similarities and differences be-
tween various human activities in the context of which the use of lan-
guage becomes meaningful. Kenny’s explanation of the confusion of 
philosophers is the prevalence of imagination:
“Philosophical confusion, we might say, happens when the imagination takes 
over the role of the intellect. We have a picture of how a word is used, and the 
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picture conflicts with our understanding of the word, which is expressed in 
our actual use of it.” (Kenny, 2008, 145)
It seems that what Kenny refers to as imagination is in fact closely 
linked to construction, speculation, the formation of abstract systems of 
thoughts. Descriptions of the details of practical language use can there-
fore reveal the fallacy of the philosopher’s picture. Particular examples, 
descriptions and details of actual language use can shake the foundati-
ons of philosophical speculation. In this sense, philosophy simply lea-
ves everything as it is:
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor dedu-
ces anything.” (Wittgenstein, 1997, par. 126)
Philosophy as therapy does not explain, it merely describes. And 
it is this description that can lead the philosopher to open his eyes and 
realize that his speculations are no more than castles in the sky.
VII
Why do philosophical delusions occur? Where do the glasses that 
distort the philosopher’s vision come from? In an attempt to determine 
Wittgenstein’s place among twentieth century philosophers, Hacker 
compiles a list of reasons that Wittgenstein considers to be behind phi-
losophers’ delusions. Wittgenstein finds these reasons not only in the 
philosophers  themselves  and  in  the  obsessions  tormenting  them;  he 
(also) finds causes of the philosophers’ affliction external to them. To 
a certain extent, transgression and the loss of sense are to be expected, 
since philosophers are in search of the boundaries of sense. As they 
are never far from the edge, there is always a risk of overstepping the 
line. However, it is still valid that “the primary source of philosophical 
confusion and superstition is language itself” (Hacker, 1997, 115). In 
this respect, the basic problem lies in the finite number of grammatical 
structures and expressions that must cater for a virtually infinite variety 
and heterogeneity of content. The form of a question can be mislead-
ing as to the form of the answer: the grammatical form is similar, but 
the same question may require different types of answers depending 
on the subject matter. Inquiries about physical objects require different 
responses than inquiries about intentions, beliefs or wishes. The same 
goes for types of expressions. Substantives suggest a reference to sub-
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stance, even though numbers and thoughts, for instance, can hardly be 
considered as substance. Adjectives give the impression of denoting 
a quality, but that is often not the case. The limits of grammatical and 
language forms conceal the abundance of concepts.
“We generate philosophical bafflement when we transpose a concept from one 
domain to another, unwittingly assuming that the logical connections which 
hold in the one domain will hold in the other too.” (Hacker, 1997, 116)
As a result of its complexity, its unmethodical nature and its opac-
ity, language is often misleading. The root of the problem is that lan-
guage encompasses a countless plurality of language games. These 
coexist, stacked one on  top of  the other,  like a city  that has emerged 
throughout the centuries. It is difficult to find one’s bearings, as there 
is no simple logic or city map to follow. Finding one’s bearings means 
becoming familiar with the architecture of the city. As Wittgenstein 
puts it – “Language is labyrinth of paths” (Wittgenstein, 1997, par. 243) 
– and it is easy to get lost in it. However, one is only truly lost when 
one is not aware of the chaotic nature of these language paths. That is 
when language truly has the power to bewitch and philosophy becomes 
a “struggle against the bewitchment of our intellect by means of lan-
guage” (Wittgenstein, 1997, par. 109).
In addition to reasons strictly related to language, Hacker also lists 
a number of cultural reasons. Paradigms can be captivating and are of-
ten imposed on phenomena that differ significantly from one another. 
Descartes, for instance, was blinded by the paradigm of knowledge 
which required a firm foundation. Enslaving images can play a similar 
role. Wittgenstein speaks of a “picture that holds us captive” (Wittgen-
stein, 1997, par. 115). Furthermore, striving for the highest possible 
level of generality is a characteristic of philosophy. This “craving for 
generality” (Wittgenstein, 1992, 17) can also be the source of philo-
sophical delusion, which is why the “depth traditionally associated with 
philosophy is an illusion” (Wittgenstein, 1997, par. 113).
Philosophy cannot break out of the world and reveal its metaphysi-
cal structure. Hence, Wittgenstein is not merely trying to express his 
aversion to generality, but is pointing to the risk entailed in the separa-
tion from the concrete and to the limit of sense, as one can never step 
out beyond one’s own experience. Another source of delusion is sci-
ence or rather the tendency that philosophy should aspire to science as 
a model. Furthermore, “the will to illusion” (Hacker, 1997, 111) can 
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also  be  a  contributing  factor,  as  certain  fantasies  are  very  appealing 
because they offer safety and protection to the individual, a fulfilment 
of one’s wishes. According to Hacker, that is why Wittgenstein believes 
that “work on philosophy is often more work on oneself, on the way one 
sees things and what one demands from them” (Hacker, 1997, 112).
All this aims to show that it is not only the glasses what gives rise 
to delusion and illusions: language as such is prone to be misleading 
and the same is true of culture! Ackerman explains how language is 
suited to everyday use, how closely it is intertwined with everyday life 
that provides it with stability. In philosophy, we often lose sight of this 
context and lose ourselves in generalizations – in “nonsensical philo-
sophical generalization” (Ackermann, 1988, 158). Not every generali-
zation is reproachable, but it seems that generalization always bears the 
risk of getting out of hand and becoming misleading – unless we keep 
our feet firmly on the ground and stay in contact with the concreteness 
of life.
Both linguistic and cultural delusions originate from the nature of 
the subject and are not – crucially – merely the result of poor philoso-
phy from the past. Ludwig Nagl emphasises that delusions are tenacious 
and that it is in the very nature of man that he is constantly exposed to 
them and that he always has to make an effort to avoid them:
“It would, e.g., be a misunderstanding to proclaim that ‘metaphysics’ can be 
quickly ‘set aside’ and forgotten (an idea that Rortyan neopragmatists share 
with Logical Empiricist): Wittgenstein, in strict opposition to this, keeps em-
phasizing  that  the conditio humana is a condition of ongoing – ‘struggles’ 
against  those  ‘false  pictures’  that  ‘hold  us  captive’  and  distort  our  experi-
ences.” (Nagl, 2011, 158)
Philosophical therapy thus represents a general and indispensable 
effort to resist erroneous understanding. In an effort to enhance the un-
derstanding of this concept, one is tempted to summarize Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of therapy in a few systematic and well-structured the-
ses. But in doing so, one would succumb to what Wittgenstein refers to 
as “craving for generality”, which he considers to be one of the tenden-
cies that lead to philosophical confusions.
VIII
In reference to the discussion above, it can be said that the portray-
al of children as being weak, helpless, and in need of protection, which 
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can be found in the culture of therapy, is in fact a “false picture that hold 
us captive”, which enslaves the modern culture and which philosophy 
must denounce. The eradication of this view is not a simple task and 
does not only pertain to philosophers.
On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  authors  are  so  eager  to  classify 
PFC as a manifestation of the culture of therapy without any detailed 
analysis is in itself a case of “craving for generality” which Wittgen-
stein’s philosophical therapy strives to defeat. This points to a two-fold 
link between PFC and the therapy culture: this culture is the context 
in which the children and teachers who participate in the programme 
of philosophy for children live. To a certain extent, this context con-
tributes to the popularity of PFC: elements of the programme such as 
proactive methods, dialogue and expressing one’s own opinion will be 
particularly attractive to parents who are trapped in the picture gener-
ated by the therapy culture. At the same time, PFC rejects the image 
of children as being weak and incapable of independent thinking and 
judgment. This opposition is an integral part of the PFC process which 
is based on children’s capacity for independent thinking and judgment 
and is aimed at fostering these very skills. This shows that the therapy 
culture both enhances and undermines PFC: it enhances it by contribut-
ing to the popularity of certain methods of PFC in the general public, 
and undermines it by advocating an image of children that is the exact 
opposite of how children are perceived in PFC.
Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy as therapy offers the tools 
required for an internal criticism of views that hold us captive in a cer-
tain culture. By focusing on the description of language and the world 
in their concreteness and plurality, he forces philosophy to come from 
the lofty academic heights down to the level of daily life, everyday 
language and the experience of life that is common to everyone, includ-
ing children. This means that philosophy is in fact a therapy: therapy 
both for the “therapy culture” and for philosophy which is losing con-
tact with people’s everyday experience. Wittgenstein’s philosophy as 
therapy thus represents a suitable model for PFC and there is no reason 
why PFC should avoid the concept of therapy – it should embrace it and 
imbue it with the content that has been developed by the philosophical 
tradition at the junction between philosophy and therapy. Furthermore, 
PFC can also apply Wittgensteinian therapy to itself, to its own presup-
positions, to see if any of them are pictures which are holding it captive. 
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The therapeutic philosophy that Wittgenstein believes to be liberating 
and that is aimed at “freeing us from false pictures” and “breaking our 
bad habits of thought” (Hutto, 2006, 218) can be used to encourage PFC 
to review its own fundamental positions on children and the goals of 
PFC. It should also serve as an encouragement for the further develop-
ment of PFC, so that in addition to allowing children to develop certain 
skills and adopt various ways of thinking, PFC might also be a space 
that allows emancipation from the generally accepted goals of educa-
tion listed above, i.e. a space where “individuals-in-their-uniqueness 
might come into the world” (Biesta, 2011, 317).
The question that might still arise is why to link PFC, which is cen-
tred on philosophic questioning, to an author who claims to be in pur-
suit of eliminating philosophical questions. The first reason is that Witt-
genstein’s philosophy is not going after the elimination of philosophical 
questions. What his philosophy actually does is opening up the space 
for reflection on philosophical questions in relation to the ordinariness 
of language and human life, i.e. in relation to the world which is also 
the children’s world. The second reason is that Wittgenstein adopts a 
very radical approach in his search for the borders of philosophy. The 
similar could be said for PFC as well which, to a certain extent, is ques-
tioning the borders of philosophy by its very existence. The third reason 
is that Wittgenstein is very radical in testing and reviewing his own 
theses. PFC would benefit from adopting the same approach, both in re-
lation to the presuppositions on which the movement is founded and in 
relation to the convictions that children and their teachers have acquired 
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FILOZOFIJA ZA DJECU I FILOZOFIJA KAO TERAPIJA
Marjan Šimenc
Tekst se temelji na kritici filozofije za djecu (Philosophy for Childern, PFC) 
kada je se smatra dijelom kulture terapije. Kritika tvrdi da PFC tretira djecu kao 
»krhku i ranjivu« te da PFC program, koji je prvotno bio usmjeren na poboljšanje 
društvenih i emocionalnih vještina, zapravo doprinosi nesamostalnosti i slabosti 
djece. Tekst želi obraniti PFC kroz argumente protiv takvoga pogrešnoga pristupa. 
U nastavku se donosi analiza koncepta iz kojega izvire kritika – odnosa između 
filozofije i terapije. U ovome kontekstu referira se na Wittgensteinov koncept filo-
zofije kao terapije koji se pokazuje korisnim za refleksiju na vezu između akadem-
ske filozofije i filozofske prakse, kao i za razmatranje temeljnih ciljeva filozofije 
za djecu.
Ključne  riječi: filozofija za djecu, kultura terapije, filozofija kao terapija, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein
